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The Canadian context1
The Canadian electoral system
Canada is a federation comprised of 
ten provinces and three territories. 
The federal parliament is a bicameral 
legislature comprised of an elected House 
of Commons and an appointed Senate. 
The provincial and territorial assemblies 
are unicameral and comprise elected 
representatives. All elections to the federal 
House of Commons and provincial 
legislatures follow the traditional 
Westminster form: the candidate receiving 
the most votes in each electoral district is 
elected.
Canada is a large country with diverse 
geography, economy and culture. The 
most obvious example of this diversity is 
the majority French-speaking province of 
Quebec. Throughout much of Canada’s 
history, regional and linguistic-cultural 
differences were brokered through two 
large centrist political parties, the Liberal 
Party and the Progressive Conservative 
Party. During the second half of the 
20th century a smaller, left-leaning party 
affiliated with organised labour, the New 
Democratic Party (NDP), also consistently 
elected a small number of representatives 
to the House of Commons.
Canada’s longstanding party system 
broke down in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The breakdown translated into a 
fractured House of Commons following 
the 1993 federal election. The Bloc 
Québécois (BQ), a separatist party, took 
most of the seats in Quebec in the 1993 
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Introduction
Canada shares with New Zealand a heritage of British 
constitutional traditions and the Westminster form of 
parliamentary government. These common origins make 
comparative study of the two countries’ experiences 
regulating political finance inviting. Canada and New 
Zealand, however, differ in important ways which have had 
significant impacts on the regulation of political finance. This 
article outlines the Canadian political finance regime and 
identifies some contemporary issues that may be of interest 
to observers from New Zealand.
The article begins with a brief review 
of the Canadian context, including the 
electoral system and political finance 
regulation. Part two concerns the Canadian 
constitution and its impact on political 
finance regulation. The development of 
political finance jurisprudence in Canada 
through disputes involving third-party 
spending limits and the differential 
treatment of small political parties are 
discussed. The third section considers 
the impact of amendments to the Canada 
Elections Act 2000 (CEA) in 2003 and 
2006 that introduced contribution limits 
and quarterly allowances for political 
parties. Lastly the article discusses ways 
in which political spending may escape 
regulation in Canada.
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federal election and formed the official 
opposition. The Reform Party, a populist 
and ideologically conservative party 
based in Western Canada, came third in 
the election. The NDP finished fourth 
and the formerly governing Progressive 
Conservative Party was reduced to a 
small rump in fifth place. This five-
party system has now become a four-
party system as a result of the merger 
of the Reform Party and the Progressive 
Conservative Party. Once again there are 
two large parties: the Liberal Party and 
the Conservative Party. However, in the 
period since 2004 neither has been able 
to form a majority government. The 
Liberals and then the Conservatives have 
ruled in minority governments without 
any formal coalition with the NDP or the 
BQ. The result has been frequent elections 
and more aggressive partisan tactics than 
Canadians have been accustomed to over 
the past century.
Framework of political finance regulation
The CEA political finance regime is 
based on election expense controls and 
disclosure. However, political party and 
candidate expenses are regulated only 
during an election period. An ‘election 
period’ is defined by the CEA as being 
‘the period beginning with the issue of 
the writ and ending on polling day’. An 
expense includes ‘any cost incurred, or 
non-monetary contribution received, by 
a registered party or candidate ... used to 
directly promote or oppose a registered 
party, its leader, or candidate during 
an election’. Outside an election period 
there are no limits on the expenditures 
of political parties and candidates. The 
election expense limits for political 
parties and candidates are determined 
by a statutory formula that is adjusted 
annually for inflation. Candidates and 
political parties must file financial returns 
with the chief electoral officer following 
an election.
Contributions to political parties, 
candidates and electoral district 
associations have been regulated by 
way of mandatory disclosure since 
1974. Contributions are defined by the 
CEA broadly to include monetary and 
non-monetary contributions and also a 
candidate’s own funds used for election 
expenses. The regulation of contributions 
captures money transferred from the 
private domain to the political domain. 
A transfer of money between entities 
within the political domain – candidates, 
electoral district associations and 
registered political parties – is not a 
‘contribution’. Contributions may not be 
made indirectly to conceal the identity of 
the contributor. The name and address 
of all individuals making contributions 
of over $200 must be disclosed by the 
candidate or political party receiving the 
contribution.
The existing contribution disclosure 
approach was reinforced by the 
introduction of contribution limits 
in amendments to the CEA in 2003.2 
Contributions by corporations and 
trade unions were prohibited, subject 
to a limited exception for contributions 
of up to $1,000 to candidates and 
constituency associations. Individual 
contributions were limited to $5,000 
adjusted annually for inflation to ‘each 
registered political party and its registered 
associations, nomination contestants, 
and candidates’. Further amendments to 
the CEA contained in the 2006 Federal 
Accountability Act reduced individual 
contribution limits to $1,000 (adjusted 
annually for inflation) and extinguished 
the right of corporations and trade unions 
to contribute even $1,000 to candidates 
and constituency associations.3
There are three forms of public 
funding in the Canadian political finance 
regime: tax deductions for contributors; 
reimbursement of election expenses for 
candidates and political parties; and 
political party allowances.4 A candidate 
who receives 10% of the vote is entitled 
to be reimbursed 60% of his or her 
election expenses. A political party which 
receives 2% of the national popular vote 
or at least 5% of the votes in the electoral 
districts in which it endorsed candidates 
is entitled to be reimbursed 50% of its 
election expenses. Political parties which 
qualify for reimbursement of election 
expenses also qualify for a quarterly 
allowance determined by the number of 
votes cast for the party in the last general 
election.
The Canadian constitution and  
political finance
Charter review
Political finance regulation exists in 
the shadow of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.5 The charter is a 
constitutional bill of rights which sets out 
rights that limit the power of the state. 
Laws that contravene the charter may 
be declared to be invalid and of no force 
or effect. As a result, courts play a hand 
in shaping political finance regulation 
through case law. The implicit threat of 
litigation also shapes choices made by 
parliament in regulating political finance. 
Political finance regulation engages three 
main aspects of the charter: freedom of 
expression (s.2(b)), the right to vote (s.3) 
and the right to equality (s.15). 
The first element of charter analysis is 
consideration of whether the challenged 
legislative provision violates a protected 
right. The plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing that a charter right has been 
infringed. The charter, unlike the US Bill 
of Rights, contains an explicit limiting 
principle. Section 1 of the charter provides 
that rights guaranteed are subject ‘to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society’.6 Once a 
There are three forms of public funding in the Canadian 
political finance regime: tax deductions for contributors; 
reimbursement of election expenses for candidates and 
political parties; and political party allowances.
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plaintiff proves the violation of a right, 
the state bears the burden of proving 
that the limit on the right is reasonable 
and justified. The justification test is 
comprised of two main aspects. First, 
the court must determine whether the 
legislation addresses a pressing and 
substantial objective. Second, the court 
must determine whether legislative 
means are proportional to the objective. 
The second part of the test considers: 
(1) whether the means and objective 
are rationally connected; (2) whether 
the means minimally impair the right 
in question; and (3) the salutary and 
deleterious effects of the legislation.7
Most charter challenges to political 
finance regulation have taken place at the 
margins of the political finance regime. 
There have been repeated challenges 
to the regulation of third-party (or 
‘parallel campaigner’) spending and to 
the preferential treatment of political 
parties and candidates in respect of 
public funding. The core elements of 
the political finance regime that apply 
to the major political parties have not 
been challenged. Indeed, the courts have 
proceeded on the implicit assumption 
that financial disclosure and spending 
limits on candidates and political parties 
are constitutional.
Third parties
Third-party expenditures were first 
regulated in 1974 and have been a source 
of controversy ever since. After being 
declared unconstitutional in the mid-
1990s, third-party spending limits were 
adopted again in amendments to the 
CEA in 2000. The third-party spending 
limits were promptly challenged by 
Stephen Harper, now Canada’s prime 
minister, who was the leader of the 
conservative interest group the National 
Citizens’ Coalition (Geddis, 2004; Feasby, 
2005). Harper asserted that third-party 
spending limits violated section 2(b) of 
the charter by unreasonably infringing 
upon freedom of expression.
The third-party spending limits 
applied to communications which 
‘promote or oppose the election of one 
or more candidates in a given electoral 
district, including by (a) naming them; 
(b) showing their likeness; (c) identifying 
them by their respective political 
affiliations; or (d) taking a position on 
an issue with which they are particularly 
associated’. Harper contended that the 
limits were either vague or overly broad 
and, as a result, unduly infringed upon 
freedom of expression. He further assert-
ed that there was no evidence to support 
the government’s claim that third-party 
spending was a threat to the integrity of 
elections. The financial limits, Harper 
also contended, were unreasonably low 
and did not permit effective campaigning. 
The spending limits permit third parties 
to spend $3,000 per electoral district to a 
maximum of $150,000 nationally.
The Supreme Court of Canada 
accepted that the purpose of third-party 
spending limits was to promote equality 
and that this purpose was pressing and 
substantial. The court dismissed the claim 
that there was no evidence to support the 
existence of a pressing and substantial 
objective, holding that parliament had 
acted based on a reasoned apprehension 
of harm and that a relaxed evidential 
standard applied given the importance 
of the objective. It went on to reject 
Harper’s argument that the third-party 
limits were vague or overly broad. The 
court acknowledged the breadth of the 
restrictions, but found that such breadth 
was justifiable in the circumstances.
The court split over whether the 
limits in question were too low. The 
majority deferred to parliament and 
accepted that the limits allowed for a 
modest informational campaign. The 
minority concluded that ‘the limits 
imposed on citizens amount to a virtual 
ban on their participation in political 
debate during the election period’.8 The 
disagreement between the minority and 
the majority stemmed, in part, from 
the poor evidential record before the 
court. A challenge to British Columbia’s 
restrictions on third-party spending, 
which are nearly identical to the federal 
limits, has been heard by the BC Supreme 
Court and is pending before the BC Court 
When third-party spending limits were adopted in 
2000, third parties were also required to file a return 
with Elections Canada disclosing details of their 
contributions and expenditures. 
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Table 1: Third-party expenditures in the 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2008 general 
elections10
Number of registered third parties
Expenditure levels 2000 2004 2006 2008
No return 0 4 7 4
$0.00 6 12 7 3
$0.01–$4,999.99 30 31 44 32
$5,000.00–$9,999.99 8 4 2 4
$10,000.00–$24,999.99 2 4 5 7
$25,000.00–$49,999.99 1 3 8 5
$50,000.00–$99,999.99 1 4 5 4
$100,000.00 and over 2 1 2 5
Total number 50 63 80 64
Total expenditures $573,854.20 $720,227.93 $1,067,680.75 $1,430,579.14
Average expenditure $11,477.08 $12,207.25 $14,625.76 $23,842.99
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Prior to 2003 political parties were required to field 50 
candidates to become a ‘registered political party’ with 
Elections Canada.
of Appeal.9 This case offers the possibility 
of revisiting the debate over the type of 
campaigns that can be conducted within 
the third-party limits with the benefit of 
a more complete evidential record which 
includes expert testimony.
When third-party spending limits 
were adopted in 2000, third parties 
were also required to file a return with 
Elections Canada disclosing details of 
their contributions and expenditures. Any 
future litigation over third-party spending 
limits will benefit from the data that has 
been gathered by Elections Canada from 
third-party election expense returns. 
Table 1 indicates that third-party spending 
is increasing; however, it is also clear that 
third-party spending remains negligible 
when compared to political party and 
candidate spending. For example, the 
Conservative Party together with its 
candidates spent $37,235,930 in the 2006 
federal election. Furthermore, few third 
parties spend the maximum allowed 
under the limits, which suggests that there 
would be little risk in raising them.
Small political parties
The Canadian political finance system 
employs a series of thresholds, outlined 
above, to ensure that public funding flows 
only to ‘serious’ candidates and political 
parties. Prior to 2003 political parties were 
required to field 50 candidates to become 
a ‘registered political party’ with Elections 
Canada. Registered political parties 
receive a number of benefits, including 
candidate–political party affiliation 
identified on the ballot and the right to 
issue tax receipts to donors. The ability 
to issue tax receipts enhances political 
parties’ fundraising capacity, as donors are 
more likely to contribute if they receive a 
benefit in return in the form of reduced 
taxes.
Miguel Figueroa, leader of the 
Canadian Communist Party, challenged 
the 50-candidate threshold on the 
grounds that it violated the right to vote 
and to run for office protected by section 
3 of the charter.11 Figueroa contended 
that the threshold created a systemic 
bias against small political parties and 
in favour of large political parties. The 
systemic bias prevented small parties 
from communicating their messages to 
voters and playing a meaningful role in 
the electoral process. The government 
response was that the 50-candidate 
threshold and the systemic bias in favour 
of large parties was justified because 
regulations should enhance the ability 
to communicate of those parties which 
have a reasonable chance of forming the 
government.
The majority of the Supreme Court 
of Canada disagreed. The court held that 
‘participation in the electoral process 
has an intrinsic value independent of 
its impact upon the actual outcome of 
elections’.12 Justice Iacobucci went on 
to observe that ‘the ability of a political 
party to make a valuable contribution 
to the electoral process is not dependent 
on its capacity to offer the electorate 
a genuine “government option”’.13 The 
court concluded that ‘legislation that 
exacerbates a pre-existing disparity in the 
capacity of the various political parties to 
communicate their positions to the general 
public is inconsistent with s.3’.14 As a result, 
the court held that the 50-candidate 
threshold was unconstitutional. 
Case law following Figueroa has been 
divided. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
heard a challenge to the thresholds political 
parties must meet to qualify for election 
expense reimbursement and allowances.15 
The small political parties that brought 
the challenge took the position that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Figueroa 
meant that thresholds to qualify for 
public funding must be unconstitutional. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed 
that the thresholds violated section 3 of 
the charter, but held that infringement 
was justified because thresholds were 
required to maintain public confidence 
in the electoral process. At about the 
same time, the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice reached a contrary result, finding 
a threshold for the refund of candidate 
deposits in Ontario’s Election Act to be 
unconstitutional.16 The court applied 
Figueroa and concluded that the benefit 
of the threshold was ‘overcome by the 
deleterious effects of diminishing the 
capacity of [small] political parties to 
present their ideas and opinions’.17 The 
Supreme Court of Canada may have to 
once again consider the rights of small 
political parties in order to give clear 
guidance to the lower courts.
Public funding and contribution limits
Prior to the 1993 breakdown of the 
duopoly that controlled Canadian politics 
for most of the 20th century, the Liberal 
Party and Progressive Conservative Party 
raised similar amounts of political funds. 
Both parties were dependent on corporate 
donations. The NDP, by contrast, received 
fewer corporate contributions and instead 
relied upon financial support from trade 
unions. The financial equilibrium between 
the Liberal Party and the Progressive 
Conservative Party, together with the 
similar sources of funding, meant that 
there was little partisan advantage to be 
gained from changing the fundraising 
rules.
The Liberal Party dominated 
fundraising in the fragmented party 
system that lasted from 1993 to 2000. The 
Liberal Party was particularly successful at 
raising corporate funds, as it was the only 
political party that could plausibly form the 
government. During the 1993–2000 period 
the populist and ideologically conservative 
Reform Party established an effective 
grassroots fundraising system. After 2000, 
the Reform Party’s heirs, the Canadian 
Alliance, and, later, the Conservative Party 
built upon this fundraising foundation by 
adopting direct and targeted advertising 
and other strategies imported from the 
United States to maximise the number of 
contributors and contributions.
Contribution limits were adopted by 
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the governing Liberal Party in 2003 as 
part of an effort to rehabilitate the party’s 
image following the ‘sponsorship scandal’, 
in which advertising agencies associated 
with the Liberal Party were used as 
conduits for government sponsorship 
of events in Quebec. Even though there 
was no proof that any of the sponsorship 
funds returned to the Liberal Party 
through political contributions, political 
finance reform including contributions 
was expedient in the circumstances.
The contribution limits had greater 
effect on the Liberal Party than on the 
Conservative Party (Flanagan and Coletto, 
2010). The effects of contribution limits 
were not lost on the Conservative Party 
when it took power after the election in 
2006. One of the reforms it implemented 
in its Federal Accountability Act 2006 was 
a reduction in individual contribution 
limits to $1,000 and a prohibition on 
corporate and union contributions.
Table 2 shows the persistent fundraising 
advantage enjoyed by the Conservative 
Party since contribution limits went 
into effect at the beginning of 2004. The 
Liberal Party has identified the need to 
develop a more grassroots approach to 
fundraising, but has been unable to match 
the success of the Conservative Party. As 
the contribution limit system enters its 
seventh year, the Conservative Party retains 
a comfortable fundraising advantage over 
the Liberal Party and, indeed, over all of 
the opposition parties combined.
Some prominent Liberals, including 
Liberal Party president Stephen LeDrew, 
foresaw that contribution limits would 
damage the Liberal Party’s dominant 
financial position. LeDrew decried the 
reforms as ‘dumber than a bag of hammers’ 
(Gray, 2006). To mitigate the anticipated 
impact of the contribution limits, public 
funding of political parties through 
allowances paid quarterly was introduced. 
Funding is determined according to a per 
vote rate based on votes received by each 
political party in the prior election. The 
per vote funding amount was set at a level 
that was intended to replace the funds 
that would be lost by political parties by 
reason of the contribution limits.
The allowances mitigated the loss 
of corporate contributions and large 
contributions from individuals lost by the 
Liberal Party. For the Conservative Party, 
which lost comparatively little as a result 
of the contribution limits, the allowances 
were mostly additional funding rather 
than replacement funding. Success in 
private fundraising together with public 
funding has resulted in the Conservative 
Party having far greater financial resources 
than any political party had prior to the 
adoption of contribution limits and 
allowances. Table 3 shows the annual 
allowances paid to political parties since 
2004.
The Conservative Party’s financial 
advantage has had an impact on the 
conduct of politics since 2006. Since 2006 
the Conservative Party has governed twice 
as a minority government. The funding 
advantage enjoyed by the party has 
allowed it to govern with more authority 
than normal in a minority situation. The 
opposition parties have been reluctant to 
bring down these minority governments 
because the Conservative Party has been 
the only political party that has had the 
financial wherewithal to comfortably fight 
an election. As a result, there have been 
instances where opposition parties have 
threatened to bring down the government 
only to relent and compromise, in part 
because of financial considerations.
The Conservative Party also provoked 
a crisis over the budget in 2008 by 
threatening to eliminate the quarterly 
allowances paid to political parties. 
The removal of public funding would 
damage the opposition parties more 
than the Conservative Party. The threat 
to funding was one of the few things that 
has galvanised the opposition parties 
and caused them to make a convincing 
threat to defeat the government. The 
Conservative Party withdrew its proposal.
Spending limits
Spending outside election periods
Canadian political parties have always 
spent some money in the days and weeks 
immediately prior to the election period. 
Until recently, however, parties did not have 
enough money to engage in significant 
pre-writ electioneering. As discussed 
in the previous part of this article, all 
of this changed in 2004. Since then, the 
Conservative Party has had the financial 
resources to engage in extensive pre-writ 
electioneering. This is demonstrated by a 
comparison of Conservative Party income 
from contributions and allowances set out 
in Tables 2 and 3 with spending limits in 
recent elections set out in Table 4. When 
comparing the tables, it should be noted 
that political parties are reimbursed 50% 
of their election expenditures.
Table 2: Contributions to major political parties 2004–09
Party 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*18
BQ $858,746 $734,729 $529,513 $429,971 $713,085 $621,126
Cons. $10,949,559 $17,847,451 $18,641,306 $16,983,630 $21,179,483 $17,707,846
Lib. $4,719,388 $8,344,162 $9,063,126.36 $4,471,903 $5,811,492 $9,564,677
NDP $5,194,170 $5,120,827 $3,972,762.57 $3,959,451 $5,412,940 $4,035,492
*2009 data based on quarterly returns, as not all annual returns have been posted by Elections Canada.
Table 3: Annual allowances paid to major political parties 2004–09
Party 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
BQ $2,733,868 $3,064,864 $2,950,984 $2,953,218 $3,017,092 $2,742,215
Con. $7,913,512 $7,331,172 $9,388,357 $10,218,123 $10,439,132 $10,351,071
Lib. $9,141,408 $9,087,333 $8,572,965 $8,517,049 $8,701,263 $7,219,593
NDP $2,883,919 $3,879,817 $4,611,140 $4,923,795 $5,030,293 $4,998,192
Table 4: Political party spending limits in recent elections
Party 2004 2006 2008
BQ $4,591,747.38 $4,676,676.52 $5,066,811.35
Con. $17,593,925.32 $18,278,278.64 $19,999,230.62
Lib. $17,593,925.32 $18,278,278.64 $20,014,302.76
NDP $17,593,925.32 $18,278,278.64 $20,063,430.10
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The competitive partisan dynamic 
created by three successive minority 
governments, together with the financial 
disparity between the parties has resulted 
in expanded use of political advertising. 
The Conservative Party has not been 
content to merely ramp up its election 
campaign in the weeks and months 
immediately prior to the election period; 
it has also engaged in strategic advertising 
campaigns when no election campaign 
was imminent. The most famous examples 
were the negative advertisements aimed at 
Stephane Dion when he became leader of 
the Liberal Party in 2006 and at Michael 
Ignatieff after he became leader of the 
Liberal Party in late 2008.
The Conservative Party’s use of 
advertising to influence political images 
and debates outside election periods 
and increased use of pre-writ election 
advertising has forced the other political 
parties to respond in kind. Despite their 
comparatively weak financial positions, 
both the Liberal Party and NDP have 
engaged in advertising to compete with 
and respond to the Conservative Party. The 
inability of the Liberal Party to compete in 
an advertising arms race provoked Dennis 
Dawson, a Liberal senator, to introduce a 
bill in the Senate to control some pre-writ 
election spending by political parties. The 
bill would include within the definition 
of ‘election expense’ any cost ‘incurred 
in the three month period prior to the 
election period’. The bill, being a private 
member’s bill originating in the Senate, 
stands little chance of becoming law and 
is best understood as a protest against 
the effects of Conservative Party financial 
dominance.
An interesting twist on pre-writ 
regulation of expenditures is found in 
British Columbia’s Election Act. The 2005 
provincial election in British Columbia 
was marked by increases in third-party 
spending. As a result, BC adopted third-
party spending limits which mirrored the 
federal limits but extended into the 60-
day period before the call of an election. 
The third-party limits were challenged 
by the BC Teachers Federation.19 The 
BC government attempted to justify the 
extension of the third-party limits into 
the pre-writ period on the grounds that 
it was necessary to stop third parties 
from circumventing spending limits 
that apply to the election period. The 
BC Supreme Court did not find this 
position compelling. The court held 
that regulation of third-party spending 
outside the election period could not be 
justified as it was not proximate enough 
to an election and, as a result, did not 
pose as great a threat to the integrity of 
an election. The court further held that 
the extension of third-party limits outside 
the election period was problematic 
because it prevented full participation in 
public debate while the legislature was in 
session.
Expenditure limit arbitrage
A second way in which the Conservative 
Party has used its financial advantage is 
what I have termed ‘expenditure limit 
arbitrage’. Under the Canadian political 
finance system, political party spending 
limits are separate from candidate 
spending limits. The major political parties 
typically spend close to the maximum 
permitted. However, candidates of the 
major political parties in uncompetitive 
districts often do not spend the maximum 
allowed. The unused spending capacity of 
candidates represents an opportunity for 
a political party with more funds than it 
can use under its spending limits because 
there are no limits on transfers of funds 
between political parties and affiliated 
candidates.
The method devised by the Conserva-
tive Party to exploit the unused spending 
capacity of candidates was described by 
the Federal Court in Campbell v. Canada 
(Chief Electoral Officer) in the following 
terms:
The evidence shows that the Party did 
in fact finance candidates’ contribu-
tions using the following scheme: 
first, the Fund issued an invoice to 
the official agent. Simultaneously, 
the official agent completed a wire 
transfer form instructing the same 
amount indicated in the invoice to 
be transferred from the campaign to 
the Fund. This wire transfer form was 
signed and sent back to the Fund, who 
filled in any missing information. The 
Fund then prepared a second wire 
transfer, directing the same amount 
of money to be transferred from the 
Fund to the candidate. Finally, after the 
transfer from the Fund was completed, 
the wire transfer form completed by 
the official agent was sent to the bank 
to have the money paid right back.
Indeed, during the 2006 election, the 
Fund transferred some 1.2 million 
dollars to the 67 local campaigns 
participating in the RMB program. The 
totality of this amount was returned 
to the Fund by way of these ‘in and 
out’ transfers with each participating 
candidates.20
An investigation as to whether the 
Conservative Party exceeded its spending 
limit is ongoing, but no charges have been 
laid. The ‘in and out’ transactions, however, 
came under judicial scrutiny in Campbell 
as a result of Elections Canada’s denial of 
election expense reimbursement claims 
submitted by candidates who participated 
in the ‘in and out’ transactions. Despite 
these concerns, it is hard to conclude 
that arbitrage between political party 
and candidate spending limits is illegal. 
Advertisements that promote a political 
party necessarily provide a benefit to a 
candidate affiliated with that political 
party whether or not the candidate’s 
name is used. Indeed, to insist upon the 
direct promotion of a candidate would 
be inconsistent with the broad approach 
used to defining ‘election advertising’ in 
the CEA.
The Federal Court in Campbell was 
not asked to determine whether the 
Advertisements that promote a political party 
necessarily provide a benefit to a candidate affiliated 
with that political party whether or not the candidate’s 
name is used.
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Conservative Party exceeded its spending 
limits. Moreover, the court overturned 
the chief electoral officer’s decision 
to deny candidates’ election expense 
reimbursement claims. Based on this 
decision, it appears that if Elections 
Canada concludes that ‘in and out’ 
transactions should be stopped, an 
amendment to the CEA will be required.
Conclusion
Political finance has become increasingly 
important to the practice of politics in 
Canada in recent years. More money is 
available to participants in the political 
process as a result of increased public 
funding and it is being deployed in more 
aggressive and creative ways than in the 
past. At the same time, political finance 
has become increasingly subject to 
judicial scrutiny. Small political parties 
and third parties have launched repeated 
constitutional challenges to the political 
finance regime and Elections Canada has 
taken more enforcement actions. The 
Canadian political finance landscape, 
though more contested and dynamic 
than that found in Australia, the United 
Kingdom or New Zealand, remains 
quiescent compared to the United States.
The Canadian experience is a 
cautionary tale for New Zealand as it 
embarks on reform of its political finance 
regime. The Canadian reforms of 2003 
and 2006 show that ostensibly neutral 
changes to a political finance regime can 
have a significant impact on the practice of 
politics and the balance between political 
parties. Canadian politics today exist in a 
state of persistent quasi-campaign. This 
condition is a result of recurring minority 
governments, but it is also facilitated and 
exacerbated by increased public funding 
and the imbalance in funding amongst 
the major political parties. New Zealand 
should be cautious before adopting any 
changes to its political finance legislation. 
In particular, even in the absence of any 
constitutional standards, the differential 
impact of legislation on political parties 
should be considered.
1 Parts of this section are adapted from Feasby, 2010. For a 
more detailed discussion, see Feasby, 2007. 
2 An Act to amend the CEA and the Income Tax Act (political 
financing), SC 2003, c.19.
3 SC 2006, c.9.
4 The reservation and allocation of free and discounted time 
for political broadcasts is akin to political funding. However, 
political broadcasting is beyond the scope of this article. 
For a discussion of the history of the regulation of political 
broadcasting in Canada see LaCalamita, 1984. For a 
discussion of constitutional issues related to the regulation of 
political broadcasting, see Feasby, 2006.
5 Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11 (the ‘Charter’).
6 This aspect of the charter resembles the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950), 213 UNTS 
221. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s.5 also 
contains a justified limitations provision that was explicitly 
modeled on the Canadian charter.
7 R. v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 153 and Dagenais v Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, [1994] 3 SCR 835. 
8 Harper v Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 SCR 827 at 
[35] per McLachlin CJ.
9 British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia 
(Attorney General), 2009 BCSC 436.
10 The data for 2000 is compromised by the fact that mid-
campaign an injunction was issued by the Alberta Court 
of Queen’s Bench suspending the rules applicable to third 
parties and then reinstated by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
‘Average expenditure’ figures do not include third parties with 
no return filed.
11 Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 SCR 912.
12 Ibid. at [29].
13 Ibid. at [39].
14 Ibid. at [54]. 
15 Longley v Canada (Attorney General) (2007), 288 D.L.R. 
(4th) 599 (Ont. C.A.). 
16 DeJong v Ontario (Attorney General) (2007), 287 D.L.R. 
(4th) 90 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
17 Ibid. at [79].
18 2009 data based on quarterly returns as not all annual 
returns have been posted by Elections Canada.
19 British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), 2009 BCSC 436.
20 Campbell v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2010 FC 43 
at[38]-[39].
References
Feasby, C. (2005) ‘Freedom of expression and the law of the democratic 
process’, Supreme Court Law Review (2d), 29
Feasby, C. (2006) ‘The Supreme Court of Canada’s political theory and 
the constitutionality of the political finance regime’, in K. Ewing 
and S. Issacharoff (eds), Party Funding and Campaign Financing in 
International Perspective, Oxford: Hart Publishing
Feasby, C. (2007) ‘Constitutional questions about Canada’s new political 
finance regime’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 45 (513), pp.519-21
Feasby, C. (2010) ‘Canadian political finance regulation and 
jurisprudence’, in K. Ewing, J. Tham and J. Rowbottom (eds), The 
Funding of Political Parties, London: Routledge (forthcoming) 
Flanagan, T. and D. Coletto (2010) ‘Replacing allowances for Canada’s 
political parties?’, University of Calgary SPP briefing papers, pp.3-4, 
http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/publications
Geddis, A. (2004) ‘Liberté, egalité, argent: third party election spending 
and the charter’, Alberta Law Review, 42
Gray, J. (2006) ‘Reality check’, CBC News Online, 13 June
LaCalamita, J. (1984) ‘The equitable campaign: party political 
broadcasting regulation in Canada’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 22 
Contemporary Issues in Canadian Political Finance Regulation
